Hi, I’m Denis Merker and this is Let’s Talk, a product of NMAS podcast. Ten days have passed since it became public that the United States is asking the Mexican government to arrest and subsequently extradite the governor of Sinaloa, the mayor of Culiacán, a senator, and the police commanders of that state for alleged links to the Sinaloa cartel group led by the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.
The accusation is serious and has put the Mexican government in a dilemma. Accepting extradition would put any elected official in our country in a vulnerable position against demands from another country, but specifically from the government of Donald Trump, and would therefore open the door to any political interference beyond possible criminal acts.
But do nothing. And given the accumulation of evidence that makes these accusations plausible, it places the president and her government at risk of a potentially more aggressive reaction from that government, and internally, their inaction could be interpreted as political protection of the accused or even a cover-up.
The researchers and essayists Carlos Bravo Regidor and Carlos Pérez Ricard are the ones we spoke to about this topic. Thanks to both of you for being here with us. How are you? Well, let’s start with that because it really is interference or complicity, or it’s practically being framed that way, and depending on how you position yourself in relation to it, it’s often the opinion of those who speak out on this delicate issue. Carlos Bravo.
Well, the first thing I would say is that it’s perfectly feasible to say it’s both things, right? I mean, the United States is certainly taking a very aggressive stance in this regard, an unprecedentedly aggressive one. I mean, it’s not the first time the United States has gotten involved in this issue, but it has never gone this far before.
Uh, and it’s also true that criminal governance is a phenomenon we’ve been dealing with for decades, right? So, I think we can start by saying both things are true. That said , I would say that, to begin with, the United States’ extradition request is the activation of a treaty in force between the two countries.
It does not constitute any illegality; it is going, let’s say, through the legal channels, right? So, even though the impact is so strong, the effect is so disruptive in Mexico, strictly speaking, I think that calling it interference or meddling is inaccurate because it is a treaty that Mexico signed and that we have activated, by the way, many times.
The problem is regarding who is being activated, isn’t it? Now, interference and illegality, legality doesn’t necessarily eliminate interference, but Carlos, it’s a bit between these two versions, interference as the central issue or actually criminal governance and the relationship between politicians and the mafia.
With Carlos, I think it’s both at the same time . I would also say that there are four axes where I can fragment the discussion. On one hand, it is the story of criminal policy, let’s say, of the capture of the State by criminal interests in a state like Sinaloa. That’s the story. It is the story of a government, of a political movement that has valued unity over the fight against those interests.
Without a doubt, this is a very hard blow against the project. I’m referring to the 4T. Third, it is also the story of prosecutors seeking cases in the United States and with many interests there. And fourth, and this is perhaps what I have emphasized the most, because I believe we can emphasize each of these points, is the aggressive policy—let’s perhaps remove the interventionist concept, but aggressive—of the United States, not towards Mexico or the region, but towards the world.
Mexico being the weakest rival here and yes, being a victim of this rather aggressive policy on the part of the United States that Sinita. It is true that so far everything has proceeded more or less legally, just as it is also true that a year and a half ago they took Mayo Zambada, they kidnapped him and took him away , just as it is also true that day after day President Trump is threatening that at any moment some kind of intervention is coming.
Look, let’s divide it because I think they both agree that they are both things. Uh, I agree with you, that they are both things. And the way we weigh it is what can also lead us to an agreement that should overcome certain internal differences. But let’s start with the issue of criminal governance, because I think that simply saying “uh” is a fact is worth understanding what we ‘re talking about.
We have seen mayors subjugated by organized crime for a long time. We have seen for a long time how they managed to get police officers, municipal police chiefs, and even state police chiefs, put in place by criminal groups. Anyway, without even mentioning the “right of way” (a reference to the practice of taking the law into one’s own hands), the vulnerability of ordinary citizens, and so on.
Let’s say, the idea that there is a problem is shared by both of them. I would like to know exactly how they understand gravity and why they believe there is also, let’s say, something that broke this possible coexistence. Look, first of all, I would say that we are indeed victims of this very aggressive attitude, but we are victims with responsibility.
Yes, indeed, as you say, there has been a long history of submission after capture and I think we are now at the level of complicity, at least that is what the accusation is about. Well, indeed, it seems to me that beyond the legal case or the legal truth that may eventually emerge, this did n’t fall from the sky and I don’t think it came as a surprise to anyone.
Nobody. Yes, yes. Because since the 2021 election of Rocha Moya, a lot of journalistic evidence has been generated about irregularities in the electoral process and about the participation of Sinaloa cartel operatives, basically working for Rocha Moya’s campaign to ensure his victory, right? And here, Denise, I think it’s very important to highlight the value of journalistic evidence.
There has practically been no corruption scandal in Mexico that has not started with journalistic revelations. We can argue that for a jury it doesn’t have the same probative value as public opinion, but that doesn’t mean it has no value at all, right? And even more so because of the experience we have had in Mexico, and I would add another factor, especially because of the hostility to which the press has often been subjected, a profound process of disqualification.
This is when the press shows its true colors. But look, you went to the Sinaloa case and it surprises me because, honestly, one of the most discussed cases in our country is the disappearance of the Ayotsinapa students. We have clarity about who the police in Cocula and Iguala responded to. Uh, we obviously have doubts about what happened at the C4 in Chilpancingo, how the decisions were made.
What I mean is, the reason this isn’t received with surprise isn’t just because of Sinaloa, it’s because the people who live in Tierra Caliente in Michoacán and Guerrero know how things are handled at their level. So, who’s surprised? But it’s not surprising, it’s been 20 years since the war on drugs started, hasn’t it? It’s like a moment, a good moment to start seeing the forest and stop focusing on the individual tree.
Because? Why are we in the situation we are in ? And I’m increasingly thinking about systemic approaches, that is, what are the illegal markets, the criminal markets that allow and enable the co-opting of governments. I keep thinking and thinking, and I can’t help but mention the 4 million daily cocaine users in the United States or the 7 million users of synthetic drugs who use drugs daily in the United States.
Of the 145,000 weapons that come and go to Mexico every year, the equivalent of 400 a day, by the time we finish this conversation, 18 or 20 will have been trafficked just like that . I find it very difficult to imagine a possible country in the strategic location of Mexico with its 3000 km border, with chemical precursors, let’s say, from China, with cocaine crossing from the Andes.
I think more and more about understanding the markets; otherwise, we’d be doomed, Carlos. In other words, I believe that nobody is condemned to everything or nothing. I think there’s a part of us, but there’s also a part where it’s difficult for me to think about public policy within this framework, right? Why can’t either the PRI or the PAN solve this? Because Mexico is indeed in an extraordinary situation.
When I talk about this, I often start by saying that Mexico is a different animal from all the others, it’s a different animal from the rest. There is no equivalent to the crime problem that Mexico has in Africa or Asia, not even in history. Yes, it is something new that we have not been able to propose, that our federalism has prevented, let’s say, fixing, that I like to start with the structural part and Sinaloa, well, it is, let’s say, the paradigmatic point.
I wrote a book about this, I also heard Adrián López talk about this, not talking about narco-politics in the Sinaloa context was very complicated. Now, let’s conclude that the movement that promised to regenerate national public life, the movement that did not do its job, and it is precisely the failure to do that job that opens the doors to intervention, these things are not mutually exclusive.
Let me, let me, we’re going to get to that point, but I want to, I think you touched on a very important and worthwhile topic, is why we are co-opted by criminals. And what Carlos Pérez Ricardo says—and I’m going to have to use his last name because everyone here is called Carlos— has to do with the place we occupy in geography, and it certainly weighs heavily, doesn’t it? The US markets carry a lot of weight .
Guillermo Trejo wrote, however, that paradoxically, the PRI had greatly facilitated democracy in the 90s, because what he said was that the PRI was a very vertical structure from the president to the mayor, with the party and the Secretary of the Interior and those forces, let’s say, that articulated, gave strength to that local representation in the face of the local de facto powers.
And the de facto powers were smugglers, drug dealers, whatever, because there were other kinds too. But ultimately the mayor did have a line that linked him to power, let’s say, with a big P. The democratic transition comes and the municipal presidents begin to change; from the outset they become members of the PAN party, but then they are quite alone, they no longer have that connection, they no longer have that support.
Their security apparatus is staffed by personnel inherited from the previous government who had often been dedicated to persecuting them when they were in the opposition. And then, finally, what it raises, and what I think is one of the most valuable explanations that exist, is that the State becomes very vulnerable and officials become very vulnerable to pressures not only from organized crime, but from all the local de facto powers that begin to, let’s say, to have a growing influence over power in Mexico. Yes, I really like that book by Guillermo
Trejo and Sandra Ley because it takes the discussion back to an origin that is even prior to democracy and war. Oh, well, that too. And to war. It would start on the 9th. It’s like the snake’s egg in a way, isn’t it? And indeed, I agree that the United States has a lot of influence, but we can’t exhaust the entire explanation there.
The process of weakening territorial control capabilities that resulted from the betrayal of democracy is one of our major blind spots. Because it doesn’t mean that everything was there before, let’s say it wasn’t . In other words, we’re not talking about an exact Eden. It was no Eden at all.
There were, let’s say, links also with criminal organizations, there were certain understandings, I think even Guillermo says so, there was a certain strategic coordination, right? A bit of drug trafficking, as they say, suddenly, let’s say in the world, it’s also true that there was less money, there was less money because this is also another very important factor, the free trade agreement generates a lot of new opportunities, not only economic ones for companies, for investment, but also criminal opportunities.
Yes, yes, yes. And besides, there’s money involved, and there are the Canadian mining companies to scam. Furthermore, to conclude this point, I believe it is very good to place that serpent’s egg there, with the added fact that the professionals of violence from the old regime began to gravitate towards other spaces because the alternation of power was expelling them.
So, who are you referring to for what? And those spaces they gravitated towards? because it ends up being organized crime. A prime example of this, for instance, is the set ETAs, right? The Cet ETA, who had originally been elite members of the Mexican army, ended up splitting off, first to be with the Gulf Cartel, and then to make their own cartel.
There are thousands of stories like that. So, one, there is criminal governance, here in this country nobody doubts that. Two, eh, it comes from far away. And the issue of where it comes from and the reasons behind it matters, because otherwise we end up with something very politicized, okay? And I want to address it.
Since when has this been happening? It’s important to say this, because otherwise I get the impression that we’ll start saying, “Morena surrendered to the drug cartels,” and I would say, let’s see, what happened that neither the PRI members, nor the PAN members, nor Morena have managed, I don’t even know if they’ve tried, but let me say it, to put a stop to this.
So, let’s say, the when is important, the since when is important. I believe there are three key moments, perhaps more important than any commemoration or any battle to understand the last 50 years in Mexico. One has to do with the DFC exodus, the elimination of the DFC, 1985, 1986 and the Hips, right? That two.
It only needs to be said for those listening that the Federal Security Directorate was, therefore, the secret police, a central intelligence and repression agency, and what later became CISEN. Later it became Sen and also the General Directorate of Political and Social Research, which also disappeared around the same time. Organizations and people disappear, but people do not disappear, and neither do their practices.
Incidentally, another idea from Guillermo Trejo. Guillermo Trejo suggests that these people went elsewhere, they went to local police forces , they went to state police forces, and those repressive practices of torture, but also their transfers of illicit funds, well, with the criminal markets they survived, they are still there.
Another very important point is that in 1985 the same thing happened: the entry of cocaine into Manzalva through Mexico, which before went through the Caribbean, began to come in and that money, it gives a lot of money, a lot of power, right? It is mostly the traffickers who come from Sinaloa, arrive in Guadalajara and begin to build their cocaine operations.
And I believe that more in the 21st century, beyond the issue of democracy and institutional fragility, the issue of weapons is indeed the issue. My central argument in recent days has been that weapons allow organized crime to expand its criminal portfolio. Now that they have the weapons, they have the ability to enter our markets.
That, let’s say, is the structural map and the date response. I think that the issue of fentanyl starts with all other drugs. I’m going back to prehistoric times, but no, but you were saying and I think where we are has a lot to do with the fact that fentanyl started killing between 70,000 and 100,000 Americans per year.
Now, let me finish with the corollary to this. Our federal structure, which was very functional for defending the country in 1857, which made sense in 1917, which made sense at the time, seems to me to be the worst way to deal with a phenomenon of this magnitude, of this depth, of this beast, this power.
So, I think we’re in the worst of all possible worlds, with so much going on outside and inside, and we still have a very weakened structure to deal with this. Let me add something, Denis, because I believe that, in effect, trying to do justice to the historical complexity of the issue, which I think we must do, shouldn’t in a certain sense prevent us from assigning political responsibilities, right? No, but the opposite isn’t true either, is it? Do the historical review and start using it politically, right? Because I believe so. Each, let’s say,
each government, each president is responsible for what happens during 6 years and for what they inherit from their predecessors, right? To the exteriors, sorry, to the rear ones. A prime example is the six-year term of Felipe Calderón, isn’t it? People who don’t go back that far in time tend to place, let’s say, the chronological beginning of this phenomenon in Calderón’s war because of decisions made by Felipe Calderón, because of the effects those decisions had, and then because of the consequences that
Enrique Peña Nieto, then López Obrador, and then Claudia Sheinbaum inherited, right? So, I just think that in that sense, beyond the fact that the phenomenon doesn’t respond to the six-year calendar, right? History is much more disorderly and more disobedient. In that sense, the six-year term is not irrelevant either, because presidents make decisions and those decisions have effects, good or bad, but they then build the reality that the next president has to deal with.
That’s why here, and that’s why it’s called Let’s Talk, what I’m trying to do here is simply to get away from the very easy things, right? To say, uh, this is the fault of one party, um, I mean, simply for that reason we wanted to say, well, let’s start from the fact that in this element of the situation we are in there is the part of the aggression of the United States, which we are going to go to, but let’s start with the issue that regardless of that, it makes us all vulnerable as a country that powers such as organized crime and those
mafias have grown and become empowered as they have. That has made us vulnerable as a country in the eyes of the outside world, whether it’s Trump or anyone else, and internally as well. We are vulnerable. Citizens are vulnerable because they are in the streets, they live in cities where their police obey interests that are not their own.
Now that you mentioned the spirit of Hablemos and in the spirit of Hablemos, one of the things I have been discovering while writing about the subject is perhaps to take away the explanatory power of Calderón himself. Something was already brewing in Mexico in 2004, 2005, in fact the first federal operation was in 2005 and it was in Tamaulipas and it wasn’t Calderón.
Then he’ll have some kind of, well, he has many responsibilities in a strategic way, right? in which they respond to that. But clearly, and I also believe that if there is a causal relationship, it is the Nuevo Laredo operation. There is a causal relationship between the deregulation of the arms market in the United States, the growth of the cocaine market in the United States, and the problem begins to explode in 2004-2005, even though that did not yet have its impact on the homicide numbers because until February 2007 Mexico was still a
more or less peaceful country. But all the ethnographic research that there is increasingly about that period, or even in newspapers, shows us that something very serious was happening, and we have not been able to get out of it, I insist, because we try to assign responsibility, but we lose sight of the much more structural, holistic aspect .
As you put it, Carlos Pérez Ricard, what you’re saying is, look, 2004-2005 is when the ban on high-caliber weapons in the United States ends. In 2004 and 2005, the law that makes the industry itself immune was passed. But then we’re talking about something that was brewing in the drug trafficking market: crossing Mexico instead of the Caribbean, and then the United States starting to sell the R15 and the K47 again.
Anyway, it starts, we’re in that phase, those many things that influenced this to become absolutely gigantic. A monster of a figure for people to have. In 2000, 3 million weapons were produced in the United States. 3 million and in 2015 16 million were produced. During that time, the population in the United States grew by 17%, and there was five times more arms production and also a higher production rate.
And I think that’s very relevant to explaining what then has to do with the capture of the… not because I have a background as a historian and want to stay in the past, but I think there is an additional factor here that is important to point out, which Ciro Murayama points out very well in his book, which is the creation of what he calls a criminal reserve army.
This coincides with structural adjustment policies, with, let’s say, economic policy decisions. Exactly. The 1994 crisis generated an expulsion of many people who migrated to the United States, but it also expelled many people from schools and the labor market that the economy could no longer absorb. What Ciro Murayama says is that during those years an army was being incubated in some way, available or waiting in some way to be summoned for something, and then all these factors that we just mentioned generate a kind of perfect storm in the
late 90s and early 2000s, which perhaps we can agree to date to the Calderón war because it is politically very easy, very obvious, but in fact it is perfect. It is highly likely that if it hadn’t been Calderón, it would have been another president, and if it hadn’t been Calderón, it would have been someone else.
The conditions were right, all that was missing was a spark. And well, the data is that brutal jump in homicides in Mexico that goes from 2006 to 2008, when we clearly realize that we are living in another country, eh, and not in that one in which precisely since the 90s the number of homicides in our country had been decreasing.
But well, that’s the part, let’s say, and we’ll address it now, regarding the reality on which the accusation is based, a country in which there are links between governments and organized crime, which makes it credible, as Mayo Zambada wrote in his letter, that Mayo Zambada was summoned to a meeting to resolve difficulties between the rector of the university or former rector of the University of Sinaloa and the governor in office. of that size, let’s say.
Well, but then there’s the issue of interference, and I’d like us to talk about that. Uh, what does the issue of interference mean? So, you say, Carlos, that they are actually acting legally, but the truth is the extradition request is not legal. Yes, yes. I maintain that legality doesn’t negate the interference, but in any case, uh, what does it mean? Why is this topic being raised? As I stated in the introduction, it seems to me that if a government, like that of the United States, makes an accusation like this against a
governor, indeed, what is the problem? which can begin to be done about elected Mexican authorities with or without evidence, seeking to go after a drug trafficker or seeking something else . So, that’s what becomes delicate, not because in this case there isn’t enough evidence, which I believe there is , but simply because the way of proceeding does leave Mexico vulnerable to the possibility of intervention by a government that has proven its interventionism, as it did in Venezuela, which it now considers part of its country. Venezuela. By the way, he
told people the same thing, the only thing that was done was with the oil, right? Well, in Cuba I think, and people in Venezuela have celebrated it a lot, and not just in Cuba. Well, the polls I’ve seen show that people are happy. Yes, well, they have some hope, but what I mean is , it’s a government that has shown evidence that it has objectives, for example, to have the extreme right govern in Latin America, let’s put it that way.
So, if there are reasons to be concerned that you hand over an instrument to say, “Ah, but if you were in your right mind, if your intentions were pure and you came to lend us a hand against organized crime, but I know you have other agendas.” In that sense, is the discussion about interference relevant, Carlos? Yes.
Uh, I’d like to start with all the possible cabats . Look, I also think that there is enough evidence, at least journalistic evidence, for Rocha Moya’s case to be examined and reviewed. And I also think that the president, the prosecutor’s office, and the 4T (Fourth Transformation) are taking too long to address the issues in Sinaloa, and I would add Tamaulipas, surely Baja California, and many other municipalities where there is evidence, at least journalistic, that something is not right there, and they are taking too long.
That said , it seems to me that the story we’re telling, when this story is told, has less to do with Rocha Moya and less to do with Sinaloa and is more of a holistic story, right? How the United States uses its instruments of justice, its own justice department, to advance agendas. It’s not just that, but it’s also that.
Because if the relevant thing, if the important thing was really the fight against drug trafficking, the former president of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández, would not have been released last year. Not only was there a drug trafficking case, the guy had been sentenced to 45 years in prison and was released a few months ago, two days before the Honduran election.
I believe we are facing a case of the war on drugs and the rhetoric of the war on drugs being used to advance political and financial interests, leaving Mexico much weaker when it comes to negotiating absolutely anything. I believe that’s the story of this, above all it’s the story of this, without diminishing its importance.
We can also talk specifically about Rocha, but I would say Rocha is the least interesting thing of all. If there is an issue that is perhaps that other agenda exists, I am sure that there is, but what is not in doubt is that they also have the agenda and we just read it last week in the documents that the United States released about its national security strategy, its counterterrorism strategy.
Clearly, Trump, since his campaign, did detect the destruction of the social fabric of the poorest people in the United States due to the influx of certain drugs, particularly fentanyl, because fentanyl is not killing rich people in the United States , it is killing that group that votes for him. So, it seems to me that there are two mixed interests, or not.
Look, I’ve been emphasizing here something I’ve written about a lot, which has to do with how Mexico’s place in American politics, particularly in electoral politics, has deteriorated. There have always been very anti-Mexican and anti-immigrant people on the margins, from Rospero and Ludops, I mean, there’s a whole genealogy to be made there of a certain anti-Mexican sentiment, even from before, right? But little by little that feeling began to occupy more mainstream spaces and Trump came to power naturalizing, normalizing that which for a long time, especially since
the signing of the Free Trade Agreement until Trump came to power, had been a discourse and a place much less, let’s say, toxic for Mexico than it occupies now. So, I think there is a process within American politics. Now, why? How was this vision of Mexico as an adversary constructed? I think it’s related, isn’t it? I believe it has to do first with Mexico taking away jobs because of offshoring, the offshoring of its companies, uh, American workers losing uh, their job opportunities.
So, there’s a part where they lose that. Second, of course, there’s the disruption to their communities when many migrants suddenly arrive in a community, right? And then you begin to feel that you no longer recognize your surroundings. Then there’s the issue of drug trafficking, but I think the most serious aspect of drug trafficking has been more recent because, well, the truth is that marijuana was very recreational, it didn’t kill you, or well, you don’t die from an overdose, no. Cocaine was associated with
Colombia. I think that this is where all these things start to come together, and then I think we are being used politically by the right wing. Look, that’s very important. In other words, Mexico has trade, migration, insecurity, drug trafficking, but then there is something within US politics which is the emergence of these ethnonationalist movements for which Mexico becomes a piñata of extraordinary electoral effectiveness.
Yes. And they’re racist too, because, well, they’re expensive, are n’t they? I believe that last week they discovered—I don’t think they discovered it, but they are now aware of the power they have to modify public discourse in Mexico. The blow of last week or two weeks ago is brutal for the party that promised to regenerate public life.
It’s brutal against the president, who is given a rather complicated decision about whether to support a hole. He was aware of the brutal blow that could be dealt and how it already seems to me that the United States has a hand in the election on the 30th, in the election on the 27th in Mexico.
What would happen? The teacher also asked, what happens if tomorrow, in full compliance with the law, the United States designates Morena as a terrorist organization? I do n’t think it’s going to happen, but it could . Or to an opposition party. Well, it does him a favor, uh, by the way, well, initially I do think so, right? I mean, yes, but from the outset it’s such, I mean, this move by the United States is very subtle because having made such a credible accusation for all of us, surgical, surgical, because it didn’t accuse someone like that
, no, it didn’t make an accusation about a man singled out by the mayor, about a man who has accusations in the Organization of American States for how the election was carried out. In short, in that sense, the United States is indeed making a move where you say, it makes a splash, a nuclear bomb in Mexican politics, but it does so legally using a treaty and with a basis.
Well, the thing is, if I were to start trying to go the way you’re suggesting , which could indeed turn out well, I think the first thing would be that others could emerge who would be equally credible and surgical as well . And there I would say that the responsibility lies, and well, I’m going to skip something I wanted to get to later, but the responsibility lies in how we respond, and particularly in how the president responds, because, I mean, the size of the interference and the damage will depend on the speed with which the Mexican government finds
a credible way to react to something like this. But you know what, there’s something else too, I mean, I think this isn’t, I mean, this level, let’s say, where the United States is already assuming itself as the one that’s going to administer justice in Mexico, it didn’t just start now. No, the outsourcing of criminal justice that Mexico has created with the United States has been going on for a very long time.
And not only that, I believe that in recent years there was also a policy that has now backfired, which was this policy of expelling, exporting, and sending in three stages. There isn’t even a term because it wasn’t extradition. Mexico agreed to send more than 90 prisoners, leaders and operators of drug trafficking, to the United States, bypassing all legal protocols.
And Mexico did this with the expectation of appeasing Trump’s fury when he was dealing with tariffs. At the time it might have been seen as, well, a lesser evil, but if it serves to solve the problems, nobody is going to take to the streets to defend those gentlemen. We have to step up and take action .
It may have served as a temporary solution, but the precedent it set is that Mexico was willing to disregard its own laws, which remains a viable option when dealing with the United States. I cannot do that because my law forbids it. If Mexico was willing to do that at that time , now it becomes much more expensive to say, “No, here we must respect the state because you were the first to condone the rape.
” Let’s start with the first thing you mentioned, which is the fact that the United States justice system has indeed been used for a long time to, let’s say, generate some certainty in our country. I honestly think about the case of Coahuila and what the paramilitaries did in Coahuila, which was horrific, and if you review it, there are fantastic works by Sergio Aguayo and the Colegio de México on the subject; we know this because of the Texas courts.
That’s where it was settled, that’s where it became known, that’s where they went to tell the story. The Yotsinapa case is largely known thanks to the investigations of Roina from Chicago, isn’t it? I think it was that double, wasn’t it? That’s where it gets complicated, and that’s why the concept of outsourcing justice works so well, and I’m really in favor of the concept.
What a prosecutor decides in the United States has been more important, and is becoming increasingly important, than what is decided in the National Palace, and not only in the Palace but also in the police and prosecutors’ offices. Look at this, how do I know how Morena used the trial of Genaro García Luna? OK. And the truth is that when you start reading the trial of Genaro García Luna, there are many doubts.
I’m not saying that the Lord is, I think the Lord clearly comes across as absolutely corrupt with public money. That became very clear to me from the investigation. What I found most complicated was the part about their connection to the crime; let’s just say, the level of evidence, I’m not sure it would have been the same as would have been required in another type of case.
And that’s why it’s so complicated for Morena to maintain a sovereignist discourse of non-intervention today when that has been happening for 10 years. I believe that some have the United States trial with García Luna, because we are not going to give it now. That said , it’s important to acknowledge the perverse incentives within that system and then point the finger at others as responsible.
Written about those perverse incentives, and I think it’s important, I mean, the United States is a tangled mess, it has everything but being homogeneous, and there, as you wrote, reputations are built by doing, imagine taking in El Chapo, El Mayo, well, all of that is careers. I’m doing research on where prosecutors who once handled cases involving Mexico end up.
I don’t have all the results yet, but they end up working in international funds. It’s going much, much better because Mexico is the perfect piñata, not only for Trump, but for the justice system itself. And he also wrote about how some characters who should be in prison in Mexico, like Barbie, right? Hey, Edgar Valdés Villarreal, like Minile himself, like Vidio Guzmán, are either free or will be free thanks to their submission, you know the path and it’s a path that eventually, for better or for worse, ends up weakening the structures of the state.
But something happened there. It’s interesting because when the issue of extradition was declared in Colombia in the 80s, the Colombian drug lords panicked about being extradited. Because? Well, because we knew that, for example, if they were put in prisons, they would completely control the prisons, which also happens here.
For example, Aguaruto in Sinaloa is incredible. It’s a prison where they’re there when they want to be, especially those from the Sinaloa cartel, anyway, but they were terrified of being extradited to the United States and they started a war against the political power to avoid it. I feel that the opposite is already happening in Mexico, I agree.
Drug traffickers are surrendering to the United States because they understand that what they know—their information—is extraordinarily valuable, or because they don’t know something and want to fabricate both things there. I would like to, no, obviously I don’t want to defend the American justice system because it is indeed very perverse, but I think we have to try to understand those incentives because while it is true that they lend themselves to a certain manipulation, their reason for being is to try to take advantage of the
information that people there have in order to expand the investigation, to go further. If you have some small fish, you negotiate with them to get information on how to catch bigger fish. That’s the advantage it has, the pressure it puts on defendants that the system itself assesses to see if it has enough evidence to say, “Don’t play dumb, you’re guilty, better confess your guilt, we’ll reduce your sentence and negotiate.
” It has that perverse side, but it also has an effective side for research tasks that shouldn’t be thrown away. Well, obviously not. So, let’s say, the issue of interference is that we are facing an aggressive government with political interests, interests that also involve combating mafias that are causing deaths in their country.
And then I think it’s very important that, taking into account all these variables, we do need to consider what the desirable response would be, if you will, from the Mexican government. And in this case, I’m going to personalize it because I think the only one who could make that decision, obviously, is Claudia Shan.
So, what is Mexico’s best interest? How to weigh things up at this moment? Look, for me it’s very clear that this is an extraordinary opportunity to address a long-postponed demand for justice. For me, that should be the priority. I understand very well the difficulties the president faces, but at the same time I believe that these opportunities only come around once in a blue moon .
In fact, I can’t think of a better opportunity in my lifetime to make that move, especially considering all the internal interests he’s going to have to face. There is a martial art called jujitsu that consists of using your opponent’s strength against your opponent. I believe that Claudia Shamam, with this pressure from the United States, has the opportunity to do another type of ayojitsu, which is to use the force of that pressure against the interests in Mexico that have resisted a true reform of the justice system for decades. This is the opportunity. It’s very
difficult, but if we don’t take action, who knows how often it will happen again? Carlos, truth, justice, sovereignty. He said it like that , in that order, but that’s also how I believe one should act. I do not think that the discourse of sovereignty should take precedence over the discourse on truth and justice.
It’s all well and good to make interventionist criticisms. I have written about that myself. I think it’s there. I think it’s not very easy to understand that when we think about Cuba, when we see how they call President Petro himself a drug trafficker. It’s interism. We’re very, very good at seeing it from the outside. I think we’re a little more blind to our own biases , but I don’t think that argument is enough to say that clarifying this is more important.
And today I do believe that the president has the opportunity to use this case as an example of how there can be no impunity. Now, again, from a more structural point of view, I am more pessimistic about the possibilities that Mexico will have to move towards a new type of society as long as these illegal markets exist, the arms market and the black market.
You brought that up yourself in the interview with Adrián López, didn’t you? Well, it seems like good people come into government, it seems like clean people come in , it seems like people who clean things up come in, and then suddenly two years later you see them accused in these things. I find it hard to believe that in markets as large and powerful as the United States, with such brutal demand, you can build simply by changing people without changing anything structural, right? Structural.
Now, but I find it interesting, what exactly is the answer? I’m going to put it this way. One, extradition. From my point of view, yes, because if Mexico, that is, if Mexico decides to disregard the extradition treaty it has with the United States or says that it will prosecute him internally when the Mexican justice system has so little credibility, although the American one inspires distrust, the Mexican one also lacks credibility, right? So, much less.
So, I think this is the problem . I would say that extradition is not the best option. I would say it is the least bad option because to the extent that we do not go down that path, we are making other actions cheaper for the United States. Because I already tried knocking on the door, asking for permission, and you’re playing dumb, ignoring me? Well, next time I’ll go with the other one, by the way, which isn’t far- fetched at all because Biden chose it in the covert operation to take the May.
Hey, extradition, Carlos. No, no, no. Extraditing is like feeding the ivy. Extraditing also means outsourcing the problem, ceasing to build capacity in Mexico, and saying, “It’s the clean way out,” while also giving diplomatic leverage to the United States. I say this with respect to the Rocha Mayo case, and I also said it at the time with respect to the case of the 98.
I believe that it cannot be done above the law. I don’t think that extradition has always been the easy way to solve problems that have to be dealt with in Mexico, and it is an open door to continue feeding a wound that will not be satisfied because I don’t believe it is in favor of them being tried in Mexico.
I believe that there should be a trial, and a fair and transparent one. I’m saying this so you do n’t think I’m inviting people who only think like me, [laughs] but judging them in Mexico has a problem, which is how we have this weakness in the face of the powers that be. The truth is that in the matter of the prosecutors, their independence was shattered to pieces, I mean, there was a huge movement against the famous crony prosecutor.
Well, but the truth is that we end up with the prosecutor’s offices being an arm of the government, of governments. Second, it is true that the courts and the judiciary are going through a period of low credibility, but well, in any case one would think that it would also be a time to do something like this.
I think that judging them credibly in Mexico would be the best response. I think we took too long . I believe that in these circumstances, that is, now we are going to do it, we have taken too long, we had many opportunities to make those reforms of the prosecutor’s offices, of the police, a reform of the judicial power that did not end up where it ended up.
I would even say another thing: try to rescue the autonomous prosecutor’s office project because the lack of autonomy right now works against us as well. So, what I would say is, yes, ideally it should be judged in Mexico, but you said this thing a while ago, uh, how did you say it? You said, “It’s hard to imagine a possible country, isn’t it? But it’s very hard to resign ourselves to the country that exists, and with the justice system we have today, I don’t think we can produce that ideal result.
We need to embark on a very long process; it’s going to be very difficult to reform the justice system so we can then do it in Mexico. But this is putting the cart before the horse, is n’t it? Yes, we lost many opportunities, but then, how do you see this issue of trying them in Mexico with that pro and con? Because if they are tried in Mexico and we find nothing, well, it’s already worse.
The Attorney General just arrived, and you can be used as one of the messages that I think she should and can give in the long term. By the way, I’m not a big fan of autonomous prosecutors; in fact, I’m an enemy of the hypocrisy of thinking they are autonomous when they are not . I prefer that it be stated clearly that the Attorney General’s Office is an arm of the executive branch and that criminal policy is defined in its broad outlines from the National Palace.
I prefer that President Claudia Sheinbaum take charge.” Or perhaps someone outside could legally handle the matter because their prosecutor isn’t exactly problematic. It seems to me like the worst possible scenario: we know they work for the president, or are close to her, yet they claim to be autonomous.
That hypocrisy, that double standard, seems to me to be getting worse. Having said that, if we continue to think extradition is the solution, we’ll remain without resolving our capacity problems. Exactly. Now, we need to resolve something immediately. That’s why I want to ask you what the answer is, because, well , we all agree that the ideal would be a strong Mexican state, capable of conducting credible trials, and so on.
I think the worst option, because there is extradition, is to try them in Mexico and limit ourselves to nationalist rhetoric, which I think would be the worst option, of course. I mean, I understand the strategic political value of nationalist rhetoric. I think there’s a concern, a sincere one, that the United States will start interfering.
All of that is fine. But I’m also going to… Let me say one thing, Denis, I mean, in a certain sense, we put ourselves in a particularly vulnerable position so that the United States could do this to us, and we have to take responsibility for that vulnerability. I mean, it can’t be that we’re more offended by U.S.
interventionism than by criminal governance. They should have , exactly, what we were saying at the beginning, they should offend us equally, but at this moment, with the phenomenon of criminal governance that we have in Mexico, I find it very difficult to think that we are in a position to give it adequate prosecution.
I’m not a fan of senators either; I hate the outsourcing of justice, but at this particular moment, what is the other viable, credible option? To limit ourselves to nationalist rhetoric, Carlos. No, that would be a mistake. It’s almost suicide. Besides, there are two things that seem to be true at the same time, right? On the one hand, that impunity is what opens the doors to intervention, it’s what enables intervention.
That’s as true as saying that the United States can go and find Rocha Moya in 500 other places in Mexico, and you’ll find them among mayors, representatives, and senators, in Mexico and throughout Latin America. And under that discourse, make whatever decisions you want. Both things are true. As Berto Castillo said, the truth is better.
The truth is always about going and telling the truth; transparency can produce truth in that circumstance. That’s the question. Well, I think that for justice to exist, there has to be truth. Who is in a position to produce a solid and credible truth? Yes, I understand what you’re saying, but on the other hand, extradition to a government like Trump’s is also an open door to something much more serious that could happen in a political intervention for future elections, because, I mean, we have criminal governance; it’s there. They’re going to resolve it, not
extradite him, and yet if it opens a door, we’re not in a situation where there doesn’t seem to be an easy answer. They ‘re all bad. They’re all bad cards, but we have to choose the poison we want to die from. Let me tell you, I think the worst is to do nothing, a
nd I’m worried that we’re already… Speaking of 10 or 12 days, for example, well , yes, they did resign, but I don’t know where they are, and it worries me that they might escape in the next few days . What’s more, after the shootout over the weekend, they found a house belonging to de Rocha. It distresses me that something could happen to any of those 10 suspects, because I think we might even have to, I mean, protect them almost with house arrest while we decide whether to investigate them, how to do it , and receive the evidence.
But this period seems deeply unsettling to me, does n’t it? And besides, it opens the door for very perverse interests to say, “You know what?” The best thing is to remove them from the path, let’s not judge them here, nor judge them there, let them no longer appear. I mean, I really think there’s an important security issue here for these people, and in the pursuit of truth and justice, we should also protect them.
You were saying earlier, the consequences of doing this, of extraditing him, could be terrible. The consequences of not doing so are also there, aren’t they? If I don’t say no. So, the problem here, and I want to emphasize this, is that we can somehow indulge in the fantasy of what would be ideal, but in the world where the president has to decide, as you asked, the cards are stacked, and for me, the consequences of not extraditing him, with all the costs that will entail, end up being worse.
Every day that passes, every day that the president, the attorney general, delays taking concrete action on the waste, I believe is a point that is lost in the United States and also lost internally. And besides the case of Sinaloa, what I would say is, we have to get ahead of it, we have to prevent it.
I am certain that they will not be left with the Sinaloa indictment. Baja California can come, Tamaulipas can come . Have you been in Sinaloa for a while yet? Well, as Jo said, the Chinese say that the best time to do something is yesterday, but the second best time to do things is today. We need to get ahead of it and prevent it from happening.
We do n’t see any rush for tomorrow, that worries me, I don’t see any rush. The shooting this weekend or the gunshots against a former Rocha house seem to me like a warning. I would like to think that the Mexican government knows where these 10 people are. Uh, I’d rather he tell us all where they are and that he has them, that he has them under his control.
I’m telling you , I insist on one thing, uh, I don’t know, in their homes, I don’t know, but that there be some clarity, because if suddenly this ends up in something else, well, uh, it would seem interesting to me because it seems that there is no good solution, however, there is an urgency to act.
I would ask them, why does it seem so difficult for the president to make a decision in a circumstance where clearly her decision goes far beyond that of the leader of a political movement and, indeed, the head of the Mexican State? Look, I would say that has a lot to do with the current state of the relationship between Mexico and the United States, because we are renegotiating a free trade agreement.
The world has fled Trump to the best of its ability. Mexico is one of the few countries that has tried to double down on integrating with the United States, because Mexico is somehow trapped in the tragic realism of having no alternative in that sense, but not having one makes the possibility of wanting to distance itself on this other side much more expensive.
In other words, we ‘re not fully aware of how problematic the relationship with the United States is, how problematic and unreliable Trump is, but at the same time we’re looking at the mistake and where we’re headed, and the economic impact that breaking off relations with the United States or starting to disregard treaties would have, or saying, “You know what? We’re not renegotiating the treaty because you’re using this other issue to pressure me here.
” I mean, we’re in a really messed up situation, Denis, really messed up. You say that, and I actually think the president’s limitations have to do with her movement. I think the president has not yet defined whether she wants to be head of state or head of party, and I think she spends half her time trying to be head of party and the other half being head of state.
And on this issue, I think he has to be the head, at least on this issue he has to be head of state and weigh that above the unity of the movement or very internal issues, which I don’t know what loyalties he should have, because otherwise he will also cease to be head of the State. Now, all of this in a context, again I want to look at the bigger picture, in the context of the attack on the Mexican consular network in the United States 53 and what may come, not only in terms of justice, right? The issue of the leaked audios, the propaganda,
everything we have seen over the last few weeks that is framed within the extradition of this man. Will any of that change? About what? From the hostility of the United States, from the consulates. of this attempt to reaffirm its hegemony at the hemispheric level. I don’t think so. I don’t think so .
I don’t believe that this, as many people have said, has an electoral motivation on the part of Donald Trump, because I highly doubt it. We saw the contrast between the earthquake it caused in Mexican public opinion and the drops it splashed in some American media. Asymmetry is also expressed there . So, if we extradite, that’s going to change, right? If we don’t extradite either.
We shouldn’t make the decision based on that because it won’t make a difference in that particular area. Look, I don’t think the United States’ interest is to bring down the Mexican government, as has also been said—I’m not being conspiratorial about that—but I do think it’s in the United States’ best interest to have a very weakened Mexico, much more weakened, a weakened government when entering the USMCA negotiations and in general with all the tariff and non-tariff demands that it’s constantly facing, not only from the White House, but from all the US State Departments.
A weak Mexico, a weak president, a president who does not have that level of popularity, is a Mexico that is convenient at the negotiating table, a bargaining chip. So, that’s the context, right? But it could be even more serious because today CL Shemon remains a popular president, and CL Sheman has the prospect of continuing to win elections in the future. We have disagreements.
Do you think that weakness will become more serious if he is extradited? I don’t think so . I believe that important things are at stake for the country. I think something important is at stake for Claudia Shembo because I think presidents clearly define themselves at certain moments. I think this will define her.
His legacy will be related to how he resolves this moment. I also think it could be very important for the government in power, which is Morena, whether or not it manages to face this. Well, let’s say, Morena has an extraordinary Popular Force that could have at one point made us think that Morena was here to stay.
I feel that if they are not able to face this situation, that long while may be much shorter than they thought. I think the central question is not whether he extradites him or not, that is a specific decision. It’s a one- off decision. He is extradited or not. It’s about what you’re going to do next with governments where you know there’s political and criminal corruption.
How are you going to react to that? Extraditing him doesn’t seem to me to be more contingent on the situation or what might happen. What are you going to do? What will your position be regarding governments, specifically those with a party structure? What are you going to do about it? Ah, I don’t have a clear answer.
Hopefully, in that response, the president will choose to be head of state and not head of party. The president has to make a decision. In other words, regardless of whether or not the issue is resolved with excion, he will have to resolve that and he will have to resolve what you were saying about the legacy. I find it incredibly paradoxical that Claudia Shabam’s legacy in this sense could be played out with respect to how she handles a legacy of López Obrador that is unfair.
I think it’s unfair. Yes, absolutely. But you know, and I think this as a woman. Uh, it seems to me, I have to say it, it seems to me, I think it’s being played. spot. No, we can’t change that, and she can’t change it either , but I do find it very paradoxical that a woman who is also very responsible in many things and who has a very dedicated style of government ends up being the one who receives this final moment of definition regarding an issue that we have been dragging along for a long time, a security issue, and yes, I do
believe that there is a government, an executive project focused on security that has been functional, that has been positive. I think that’s the most something the government can boast about . It has to do with security, whether it’s due to a crime issue where the government starts to be affected, is another thing, he wants to be president.
Yes, the one who wants to be president. The presidency is a horrible place. In politics you don’t decide when opportunities present themselves , you decide what to do when they present themselves. Yes, that’s what Claudia Shema is facing. Yes, it’s a defining moment. The extradition issue may not be the complete decision, but the message being sent there, that is, the change you want to make , starts there in that message.
Now, in politics there are also mistakes or challenges that one has and has to solve, and then mistakes that one makes on one’s own. Yes. And not having acted in Sinaloa at the time is indeed a mistake attributed to the government, which is not a function of going out to… it could have been done again now.
If it hadn’t been Sinaloa, I would have come to the United States with another custom, with a mayor, and there the menu is very broad, unfortunately. In that case, intervention has no limits. Carlos, [laughs] Carlos, I thank you both for being here on Let’s Talk. Thanks a lot. Thank you so much for joining us.
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